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Abstract—The study examines the relationship between
Internet censorship and crime rate. Classical views of
censorship suggest that filtering contents that are per-
ceived as negative such as violence and pornography can
have a negative impact on crime rate. However, there is
no evidence to suggest any causal relationship between
censorship and crime rate. The Internet has made it
easier for individuals to access any information they
want, and hence Internet Censorship is applied to filter
contents that are deemed negative. We discussed several
approaches that may be used to estimate the relationship
between Internet Censorship and Crime Rate, and we
decided to use OLS. We found that Conflict Internet
Censorship is the only type of Internet censorship that
has a significant negative impact on Crime Rate. Further-
more, it only significantly affects Crime Rate for highly
educated countries.
Keywords: Internet Censorship; Crime Rate; Educa-
tion; Conflict Censorship
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate for and against censorship has been
going on for decades. By removing contents that are
deemed inappropriate, it is reasonable to suggest that
censorship may be able to control a person’s behavior,
including his or her likeliness to participate in crime.
However, it is questionable whether or not the impact
of censorship is significant enough, and censorship is
not without its disadvantages. With the introduction of
the Internet, everyone can access any information in
an instant, and thus Internet censorship was born to
control the information that is shared on the World
Wide Web.
In Section II, we discuss about the definition of
Internet censorship, its advantages and disadvantages.
Furthermore, we discuss the theoretical relationship
between Internet censorship and crime rate. We argue
that although it is reasonable to suggest that Internet
censorship has a negative impact on crime rate, there
is no sufficient evidence to suggest that claim.
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In Section III, we discuss several approaches that
can be used to estimate the relationship between In-
ternet censorship and crime rate. We consider several
methods such as OLS, fixed effects and 2SLS, but we
decide to settle on OLS method. In Section IV, we
talk about the obtained data regarding their sources
and measurements. Furthermore, we discussed reasons
why we wanted to include the obtained variables to
our model.
In Section V, we estimate the relationship between
Internet Censorship variable and Crime Rate variable
using OLS. We conclude that only conflict Internet
Censorship variable is likely to have an impact on
Crime Rate variable. Furthermore, we introduce sev-
eral interaction variables between each of the Internet
Censorship variables and a high education dummy.
We find that the impact of Internet penetration and
censorship are more significant for highly educated
countries. In Section VI, we summarize our results and
stated several limitations of our analysis.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. What is Internet Censorship?
Internet censorship refers to the act of filtering
and controlling what can be accessed on the Internet,
usually done by the government to control the public.
There are several approaches to Internet censoring
(Ref. [1]):
• Technical Blocking. Technical Blocking simply
refers to the act of blocking access to Internet
sites such as IP blocking, DNS tampering, and
URL blocking using a proxy. This also includes
keyword blocking, which is a method used to
block access to sites that have specific words in
their URLs.
• Search Result Removals. Search Result Removals
is a common censorship approach applied by In-
ternet search engines such as Google and Yahoo.
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Instead of blocking access to specific sites, this
approach makes finding them much more difficult.
In many cases, this is used to make finding pirated
contents much harder to do.
• Takedown. The takedown approach simply de-
mands specific sites to be removed from the
Internet.
• Induced Self-censorship. In many cases, individu-
als will stay away from several websites that may
question the authorities, even when these sites are
not restricted e.g. porn sites that include child
pornography.
Furthermore, Ref. [1] divided Internet censorship
into four types based on their themes:
• Political Internet Censorship. Political Internet
Censorship includes censoring contents related to
views that oppose the current political regime.
Censorship regarding to contents related to hu-
man rights, minority rights, religious movements
and freedom of speech are also included in this
group. Countries with high-level Political Internet
Censorship include Vietnam and Uzbekistan.
• Social Internet Censorship. Social Internet Cen-
sorship includes censoring contents that are
deemed inappropriate by several religious or po-
litical groups, such as pornography, violent ma-
terials, gambling websites and any other contents
that may not be suitable for children. Countries
with high-level Social Internet Censorship include
Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
• Conflict (Security) Internet Censorship. Conflict
Internet Censorship deals with contents including
separatist movements, border issues and any other
military movements that may jeopardize the secu-
rity and safety of the country. Countries with high-
level Conflict Internet Censorship include China
and South Korea.
• Internet Tools Censorship. Internet Tools Censor-
ship covers blocking and censoring tools that are
used by Internet users such as e-mail, Internet
hosting, translation, search engines and any other
communication tools that use the Internet. Coun-
tries with high-level Internet Tools Censorship
include Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Internet Censor-
ship
The debate in censorship has never been resolved,
and it only amplifies after the introduction of the
Internet. There are several advantages of Internet cen-
sorship:
• It protects individuals from incorrect and bi-
ased information. According to Ref. [2] there is
no sufficient evidence to suggest that children
can differentiate credible information from non-
credible ones. This can be dangerous as biased
and incorrect information can affect a child’s
perspective in a very significant way.
• It protects individuals from contents that can be
deemed inappropriate such as pornography. Be-
sides religious and ethical reasons, pornography
may have negative impacts towards young men
and women, as they are more likely to engage in
risky sexual behaviors when they are exposed to
high-level of pornography (Ref. [3])
• It battles piracy by blocking contents that may
violate intellectual property rights.
• It protects individuals from online scams.
• It can protect individuals from cyber-bullying,
cyber-racism, cyber homophobia and cyber-
sexism (Ref. [4]).
However, Internet censorship is not without any
disadvantages. Some of these disadvantages include:
• It limits freedom of speech. According to Ref. [5],
the Computer Crime Act in Thailand has been
criticized for its excessive Internet censorship.
• It gives government too much power and control
over information. This has been considered as a
huge issue in China, as it may delay the radical
change that China needs (Ref. [6]).
C. How Internet Censorship May Relate to Crime
Rate?
The possible relationship between Internet censor-
ship and crime rate stems from the relationship be-
tween crime rate and media censorship in general. The
classical notion argued by most people is that violence
and pornography in media have significant impacts on
an individual’s violent behavior. However, a study by
Ref. [7] concluded that there is no sufficient evidence
to suggest any relationship between media violence
effects and violent crime. Furthermore, Ref. [8] argued
that pornography does not lead to an increase in violent
sexual behavior.
The Internet takes information sharing to a different
level, and its introduction to the public makes media
censorship so much more complicated. With the In-
ternet, any individual can access any information they
want, and without any restrictions these information
include child pornography, drug market and any other
contents that are not only deemed inappropriate but
are also expected to increase criminal intent. Along
with Internet usage, Internet censorship has also been
increasing and it is gaining attention from scholars
from different disciplines such as media and commu-
nication, information technology, law, political science
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and economics (Ref. [9]). In the next section, we are
going to use several approaches that can be used to
inspect the relationship between Internet censorship
and crime rate.
III. EMPERICAL STRATEGY
A. Using OLS: Possible Endogeneity Problem
One way to estimate the relationship between In-
ternet censorship and crime rate is by using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS). Consider the following equation:
crimei = β0 + β1 · conflicti + β2 · politicali
+ β3 · sociali + β4 · toolsi + ei, (1)
where crimei is the crime rate in country i, conflicti
is the level of conflict Internet censorship in country i,
politicali is the level of political Internet censorship
in country i, sociali is the level of social Internet
censorship in country i, toolsi is the level of Internet
tools censorship in country i and ei captures all unob-
served influences on crime rate in Eq. (1). In order to
consistently estimate Eq. (1), the error term ei must not
be correlated with any of the regressors in the equation.
If ei is correlated to any of the regressors in Eq. (1),
then the correlated regressors are endogenous in the
equation and their respective parameters will be biased.
For example, if conflicti is correlated with ei in the
equation, then conflicti is endogenous in the equation
and β1 is biased. When the parameter is biased, any
inferences and tests such as t-tests and F-tests will
be invalid. Thus, OLS can only consistently estimate
the parameters in Eq. (1) when all regressors in the
equation are exogenous.
However, there are reasons to believe that the re-
gressors in Eq. (1) may be endogenous:
• Internet censorship is expected to be correlated
with Internet penetration. When a country is more
exposed to the Internet, there are many complica-
tions that come with it and hence it is normal
for the government to pay more attention to
media censorship. Furthermore, Bitso et al (2012)
reported that Internet censorship has been increas-
ing together with Internet penetration. Access to
Internet may have an impact on crime rate, as the
Internet makes it easier to obtain illegal weapons.
• A country’s openness may be correlated with
Internet censorship, as they both can represent
a country’s attitude towards other countries and
global information. Such general behavior of a
country may have an impact on its crime rate.
Furthermore, it is possible that Internet censorship
may be correlated with other influences on crime rate
such as economic growth, population and land area.
Taking these variables into account, we consider the
following equation:
crimei = β0 + β1 · conflicti + β2 · politicali
+ β3 · sociali + β4 · toolsi
+ β5 · internet penetrationi
+ β6 · gdp growthi + β7 · land areai
+ β8 · populationi + β9 · opennesi + ui (2)
where internet penetrationi is the number of internet
users per 100 people in country i, gdp growthi is the
annual GDP growth of country i, land areai is the
land area of country i, populationi is the population of
country i, opennessi is the sum of exports and imports
of goods and services measured as a share of GDP of
country i and ui captures the unobserved influences on
crime rate in Eq. (2).
B. Other Approaches to Consider
Another way to consistently estimate the impact of
Internet censorship on crime rate is to use the fixed
effect model. We consider the following equation
crimeit = β0 + β1 · conflictit + β2 · politicalit
+ β3 · socialit + β4 · toolsit + β5 ·Xit
+ hi + εit (3)
where crimeit is the crime rate in country i at time t,
conflictit is the level of conflict Internet censorship in
country i at time t, politicalit is the level of political
Internet censorship in country i at time t, socialit is
the level of social Internet censorship in country i at
time t, toolsit is the level of Internet tools censorship
in country i at time t, Xit is a vector of observed
influences on crime rate for country i at time t (such
as Internet penetration), hi is the fixed effect and εit is
the error term in Eq. (3). In this case, hi represents any
unobserved influences of crime rate that vary across
countries, but not across time.
In this fixed effect model, we are allowing the
regressors, including the Internet censorship variables
to be endogenous. In other words, the regressors are
allowed to be correlated with the fixed effect hi. How-
ever, in order to consistently estimate equation Eq. (3),
there are two conditions that should be satisfied:
1) It requires a panel data set.
2) The following assumption needs to be satisfied
E(εit|conflicti,politicali, sociali, toolsi, Xi, hi) = 0,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4)
Therefore, we are not going to use the fixed effect
model in this case due to the following conditions:
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• We do not have a panel data set for Internet
censorship available.
• The Internet censorship variables do not vary
highly across time. This can create a problem
when we estimate Eq. (3), as we cannot include
regressors that do not vary across time in a fixed
effect model.
• The assumption Eq. (4) is a very restrictive as-
sumption. It requires the regressors to be uncor-
related with the error term εit for all time periods.
Another approach to consider is to use a Two-Staged
Least Squares (2SLS) model. However, at this point we
do not have an Instrument Variable (IV) available, as
more analysis regarding the topic is still needed. In the
next section, we are going to discuss the data that we
are going to use and how we are going to use them.
IV. DATA
A. Data Description
In this article, we are using a cross-sectional data set
for the year of 2013, consisting of 60 countries; thus,
i = 1, 2, . . . , 60.
The dependent variable, crimei is obtained from
Ref. [10]. The crime index is an estimation of overall
level of crime in a given country (Ref. [10])1. It is used
a proxy for a country’s crime rate. The range for this
variable is from 0 to 100.
The Internet censorship variables conflicti,
politicali, sociali and toolsi are obtained from
Ref. [1]. The value that these Internet censorship
variables can take is either 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4. The Internet
censorship variables take a higher value as a country’s
level of Internet censorship becomes more intense.
The Internet censorship variables take the value of
0 if there is no evidence of filtering. For example,
conflicti = 0 when there is no evidence of Conflict
Internet Censorship.
The Internet censorship variables take the value of 1
if there is suspected filtering; that is when even though
there is no confirmation of Internet censorship, there
are connectivity problems that suggest its presence.
For example, conflicti = 0 when there is evidence
of Suspected Conflict Internet Censorship.
The Internet Censorship variables take the value of
2 if there is selective filtering, that is censoring a few
specific sites within a category or targeting a single
category. For example, conflicti = 2 when there is
evidence of Selective Conflict Internet Censorship.
The Internet censorship variables take the value of
3 if there is substantial filtering, that is censoring
1For a detailed calculation of Crime Index, see the Numbeo
website.
several categories at a medium level or filtering many
categories at a low level. For example, conflicti = 3
when there is evidence of Substantial Conflict Internet
Censorship.
The Internet censorship variables take the value of
4 if there is pervasive filtering, that is censoring sites
at a high level, targeting a large portion of several
categories. For example, conflicti = 4 when there is
evidence of Pervasive Conflict Internet Censorship.
Internet penetration, internet penetrationi, is ob-
tained from Ref. [11]. It represents the number of In-
ternet users per 100 people in a country. It is measured
in proportion, with values ranging from 0 to 100.
GDP Growth, gdpgrowthi, is obtained from
Ref. [11]. It is the annual percentage growth rate GDP
at market prices based on constant local currency. In
this model, we are using GDP growth of a country
as a proxy of its economic growth. It is measured in
percentage.
Land area, land areai, is obtained from Ref. [11].
It is a country’s total area, excluding area under inland
water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and
exclusive economic zones. It is measured in squared
kilometers.
Population, populationi, is obtained from Ref. [11].
It is the de facto definition of population, which counts
all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship,
except for refugees. It is measured in number of people.
Openness, Opennesi, is obtained from Ref. [11]. It
is known as Trade, which is the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured as a share of
gross domestic product. In this model, we are using
trade as a proxy for a country’s general openness
towards other countries. It is measured in percentage
of GDP.
The Internet censorship variables conflicti,
politicali, sociali, and toolsi are measured by
Ref. [1] as ordinal, numerical variables. In this model,
we are going to use them as they are. We considered
transforming them into binary variables for each level
of censorship, but we decided against it due to the
following reasons.
None of the 60 countries sampled have a censorship
value of 1, that means none of the 60 countries have
any evidence of suspected Internet censorship. Fur-
thermore, the dummy variables together have a near-
singular matrix.
If we transform each Internet censorship variables
into binary variables, we are going to end up with 4×
4 = 16 variables, or at least 3×4 = 12 variables if we
do not add the Suspected Internet censorship variables.
Since our sample size is only 60 countries, it is not a
good idea to have too many variables as it would use
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too many of our degrees of freedom. Furthermore, we
want to have enough degrees of freedom if we want
to add more variables into the model.
The Internet censorship variables are obtained from
the same source (Ref. [1]), and it is reasonable to as-
sume the relationship between the levels of censorship
to be approximately linear.
B. Preliminary Analysis
The dependent variable crimei represents the crime
rate of 60 countries with an average of 44.577. It can be
seen from Fig. 1 that the distribution is approximately
bell-shaped. Furthermore, the Jarque-Bera probability
is 0.381051, which means there is no sufficient evi-
dence to suggest that crime rate is not normally dis-
tributed. Our independent variables of interest, the In-
ternet censorship variables conflicti, politicali, sociali,
and toolsi have an average of 0.516667, 0.883333, 0.8
and 0.566667, respectively
It can be seen from Fig. 2–5 that each of the Internet
censorship variables seem to have a negative correla-
tion with crime rate, as each of their linear trend is
going downwards. We can interpret the regression lines
as of the following. An increase of 1 point in conflict
Internet censorship is expected to decrease crime rate,
on average, by 4.7231 points. An increase of 1 point
in political Internet censorship is expected to decrease
crime rate, on average, by 1.8523 points. An increase
of 1 point in social Internet censorship is expected
to decrease crime rate, on average, by 3.3102 points.
An increase of 1 point in tools Internet censorship
is expected to decrease crime rate, on average, by
3.6239 points. The negative correlations between each
of the Internet censorship variables and crime rate
are reasonable, as we expect censorship to decrease
a person’s criminal intent, or at least prevent it from
going higher. In the next section, we are going to
see if there is a deeper relationship between Internet
censorship and crime rate.
Fig. 1. The Bell-shaped Distribution of the Crime Rate Index.
V. ESTIMATION, RESULTS, AND
DISCUSSION
A. Ordinary Least-Squares Estimation
The simplest way to estimate the relationship be-
tween Internet Censorship and Crime Rate is to use the
ordinary least-squares (OLS) method. In the following,
we define Eq. (1) as Model A and Eq. (2) as Model B.
The results of the statistical analysis for Models A
and B are shown in Table I. In the table, the values
in round parenthesis are standard errors and in square
parenthesis are t-statistics. The key findings are of the
following. In both models, none of the internet censor-
ship variables are individually and jointly, significant
statistically at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significances.
At the same time, if we do a one-tail test for the
Conflict Internet Censorship variable for both models,
we have sufficient evidence to suggest that there is
Fig. 2. The Correlation Between Conflict Censorship Variable and
Crime Rate Variable.
Fig. 3. The Correlation Between Social Censorship Variable and
Crime Rate Variable.
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Fig. 4. The Correlation Between Political Censorship Variable and
Crime Rate Variable.
Fig. 5. The Correlation Between Tools Censorship Variable and
Crime Rate Variable.
a significant negative relationship between Conflict
Internet Censorship variable and Crime Rate variable
at 10% level of significance, but not at 5% and 1%. For
Model A, an increase of 1 point in Political Internet
Censorship variable is expected to increase Crime Rate
variable on average by 1.90 points, ceteris paribus. This
is unexpected, as we would expect that the Internet
Censorship variable to be negatively correlated to
Crime Rate. In Model A, the other Internet censorship
variables are expected to decrease Crime Rate variable.
None of these variables are statistically significant. For
Model B, an increase of 1 point in Social Internet
Censorship variable is expected to increase Crime Rate
variable, on average, by 0.69 point, ceteris paribus.
This is unexpected, as we would expect Internet Cen-
TABLE I
THE RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS USING THE
ORDINARY LEAST-SQUARES METHOD FOR MODEL A (EQ. (1))
AND MODEL B (EQ. (2)).
Estimation Model A Model B
Constant 46.81 63.46
(2.43) (6.66)
[19.29] [9.52]
Conflict −4.17 −3.77
(2.55) (2.45)
[−1.63] [−1.54]
Political 1.90 −0.08
(2.31) (2.37)
[0.82] [−0.03]
Social −1.31 0.69
(2.62) (2.49)
[−0.50] [0.28]
Tools −1.26 −1.63
(3.46) (3.24)
[−0.36] [−0.50]
Internet Penetration - −0.22
(0.09)
[−2.53]
GDP Growth - 0.15
(0.87)
[0.17]
Land Area - 0.00
(0.00)
0.45
Population - 0.00
(0.00)
[−0.53]
Openness - −0.07
(0.04)
[−1.73]
F -stat for Internet Censorship 2.12 1.50
Sample Size 60 60
R2 0.11 0.34
SE of Regression 14.70 13.28
sorship variable to be negatively correlated with Crime
Rate variable. In Model B, the other Internet censorship
variables are expected to decrease Crime Rate. None
of these variables are statistically significant.
The marginal effect of the Internet Censorship vari-
ables on Crime Rate variable is lower on Model B,
except for the Tools Internet Censorship variable. For
Model B, an increase of 1 point in Internet Penetration
variable is expected to decrease Crime Rate variable,
on average by 0.22 points, ceteris paribus. This is eco-
nomically significant. It is also statistically significant
at 5% and 10% level of significance, but not at 1%.
For Model B, an increase of 1% point in GDP
growth is expected to increase Crime Rate variable,
on average, by 0.15 points, ceteris paribus. It is not
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance. This is unexpected, as common sense
suggests that a country’s economic growth is signif-
icantly and negatively correlated with crime rate. For
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Model B, both Land Area and Population variables
are economically and statistically insignificant. An
increase of 1% point in trade is expected to decrease
Crime Rate variable, on average, by 0.07 points, ceteris
paribus. While this is economically not too significant,
it is statistically significant at 10% level of significance.
It can be seen that GDP growth, Land Area and Pop-
ulation variables are not statistically or economically
significant. Thus, we consider the following model and
estimate the parameters using OLS. We call it Model C.
crimei = β0 + β1 · conflicti + β2 · politicali
+ β3 · sociali + β4 · toolsi
+ β5 · internet penetrationi
+ β6 · opennesi + ui. (5)
The results of the statistical analysis using Model C
are shown in Table II. From the model, we conclude:
An increase of 1 point in Conflict Internet Censor-
ship variable is expected to decrease Crime Rate,
TABLE II
THE RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS USING THE
ORDINARY LEAST-SQUARES METHOD FOR MODEL C (EQ. (5)).
Estimation Model C
Constant 63.78
(4.54)
[14.06]
Conflict −4.19
(2.26)
[−1.86]
Political 0.29
(2.11)
[0.14]
Social 0.86
(2.37)
[0.36]
Tools −2.03
(3.05)
[−0.66]
Internet Penetration 0.22
(0.07)
[−3.13]
GDP Growth -
Land Area -
Population -
Openness −0.07
(0.04)
[−2.00]
F -stat for Internet Censorship 2.41
Sample Size 60
R2 0.34
SE of Regression 12.94
on average, by 4.19 points, ceteris paribus. Unlike
Model B, a one-tail t-test will conclude that Conflict
Internet Censorship variable has a significant negative
relationship with Crime Rate variable at 10% and 5%
level of significances, but not at 1%.
An increase of 1 point in Political Internet Censor-
ship variable is expected to increase Crime Rate, on
average, by 0.29 points, ceteris paribus. Compared to
Model B, the parameter estimate for Political Internet
Censorship variable is now positive instead of negative.
It is statistically insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10% level
of significances.
Political, Social and Tools Internet Censorship vari-
ables are still statistically insignificant in Model C.
Internet Penetration and Openness variables are still
statistically significant, and the values of the parameter
estimates are approximately the same as in Model B.
The R2 coefficient for Model C is approximately the
same as Model B, even after we drop three variables.
The standard error of regression for Model C is
lower than Model B. This shows that by dropping
statistically irrelevant variables such as GDP growth,
Land Area and Population variables from Model B, we
allow more degrees of freedom and hence increasing
the efficiency of the model. Based on Models A, B, and
C, we conclude that there is a statistically significant
negative relationship between Conflict Internet Censor-
ship variable and Crime Rate variable. However, we
have no evidence to support any causal relationship
between Political, Social -r Tools Internet Censorship
variable and Crime Rate variable.
B. The Education Effect
One variable that is expected to be correlated with
Internet Usage, Internet Censorship, and Crime Rate
variable is Education variable. Common sense suggests
that an educated individual is more likely to use the
Internet than a non-educated individual. Furthermore,
Ref. [12] stated that education could significantly
reduce a person’s participation in crime. Education
can increase a person’s wage and that may reduce an
individual’s motivation to participate in crime. Further-
more, education can change an individual’s aversion to
risk, making him or her more risk averse and hence less
likely to participate in crime.
We are interested to see whether Internet penetration
and Internet censorship affect crime rate differently
for highly educated countries, compared to poorly
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educated countries. We consider the following equation
crimei = β0 + β1 · conflicti + β2 · politicali
+ β3 · sociali + β4 · toolsi
+ β5 · conflicti · high educationi
+ β6 · politicali · high educationi
+ β7 · sociali · high educationi
+ β8 · toolsi · high educationi
+ β9 · internet penetrationi
+ β10 · internet penetrationi · high educationi
+ β11 · opennessi + ui (6)
where high educationi takes the value of 1 if country
i is a highly educated country and 0 otherwise. A coun-
try is considered highly educated when its education
index is 0.75 or higher. Education index is an index that
represents the education quality of a country, based
on adult literacy rate (with two-third weighting) and
the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary Gross
Enrollment Ratio (GET) (with one-third weighting)2.
It is obtained from Ref. [13] and the value range is in
between 0 and 1. We estimate the parameters in Eq. (6)
by OLS and the results are summarized in Table III.
Table III shows the parameter estimates of Eq. (6)
(Model D). The key result are of the following. None
of the Internet Censorship variables are statistically
insignificant by themselves, at 1%, 5% and 10% level
of significance. This means there is no sufficient evi-
dence to suggest that there is a significant relationship
between Internet censorship and crime rate in poorly
educated countries. The interesting part about this is
that conflict Internet censorship is no longer expected
to have a significant negative impact on crime rate.
The Internet censorship variables and their interaction
dummies are jointly significant at 5% level of signif-
icance. The interaction term between conflict Internet
censorship and high education is economically and
statistically significant at 10% level of significance,
but no at 5% and 1%. The marginal effect of conflict
Internet censorship on crime rate is expected to be
lower (more negative) for highly educated countries,
on average, by 8.36 points than for poorly educated
countries, ceteris paribus. The other interaction vari-
ables are statistically insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10%
level of significance. The Internet penetration variable
is no longer statistically significant by itself at 1%, 5%
and 10% level of significance. This means there is no
evidence to suggest that there is a causal relationship
between Internet censorship and crime rate for poorly
2For a detailed calculation of Education Index, see the United
Nation Development Programme website
educated countries. The marginal effect of Internet
penetration on crime rate is expected to be lower (more
negative) for highly educated countries, on average, by
0.19 point than for poorly educated countries, ceteris
paribus. It is economically and statistically significant
at 10% and 5% level of significance, but not at 1%.
Openness variable is statistically significant not only
at 10%, but also at 5% level of significance. It is still
not statistically significant at 1% level of significance.
The standard error of Model D is lower than that of
Model C.
C. Discussion and Recommendation
Common sense suggests that Internet Censorship
would have a negative impact on crime rate. However,
TABLE III
THE RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS USING THE
ORDINARY LEAST-SQUARES METHOD FOR MODEL D (EQ. (6)).
Estimation Model D
Constant 59.84
(4.67)
[12.82]
Conflict 0.97
(3.44)
[0.28]
Political −0.02
(2.31)
[−0.01]
Social −0.08
(3.23)
[−0.03]
Tools −5.92
(4.33)
[−1.37]
Conflict · High Education −8.36
(4.60)
[−1.82]
Political · High Education −1.43
(4.89)
[−0.29]
Social · High Education 4.18
(5.09)
[0.82]
Tools · High Education 4.13
(8.63)
[0.48]
Internet Penetration −0.01
(0.11)
[0.48]
Internet Penetration · High Education −0.19
(0.08)
[−2.22]
Opennes −0.08
(0.04)
[−2.06]
F -stat for Internet Censorship 2.44
F -stat for Interaction Dummies 1.83
Sample Size 60
R2 0.44
SE of Regression 12.46
42
Cite this article as: E. B. Karnadi, “Does internet censorship reduce crime rate?,” CommIT Journal, vol. 9,
no. 1, pp. 35–44, 2015.
it can be seen from Model A to D that there is no
sufficient evidence to suggest that there is a causal
relationship between Political, Social or Tools Internet
censorship and crime rate. It is interesting to see
that we have no evidence suggesting any relationship
between social Internet censorship and crime rate.
Internet pornography and violence are not likely to
decrease crime, but perhaps they do not significantly
increase crime either.
Based on Models A to D, it can be seen that Conflict
Internet Censorship has a more significant impact on
crime rate than the other forms of Internet censorship.
In models A to C, at 10% level of significance, there
are sufficient evidence to suggest that there is a sig-
nificant negative relationship between Conflict Internet
Censorship and Crime Rate. In Model D, Conflict
Internet Censorship seems to only have a significant
negative impact on Crime Rate for highly educated
countries. It can also be seen from Model D that
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Internet
Penetration has a significant negative impact on crime
rate for highly educated countries, but not poorly
educated countries. In contrast, Political, Social and
Ttools Internet Censorship do not have any statisti-
cally significant impact on crime rate for either highly
educated or poorly educated countries.
The main idea that deduced from Model D is that
perhaps all the Internet variables are more impactful for
highly educated countries. It is reasonable to suggest
that educated individuals are more familiar with the
Internet, and are more able to use it effectively. For
example, not only a highly educated person can use
the Internet to communicate with others, but they
can also use it to open their online business. With
more income opportunities and more things to do,
individuals are less likely to participate in criminal
activities. Furthermore, the Internet open more ways
to obtain information, and it can boost the education
level of a country significantly. As stated by Ref. [12],
education makes a person to be more risk averse, and
hence less likely to be participating in crime.
However, educated individuals are also more able
to use the Internet for negative activities. Whether
it is for a good reason or not, rebels can use the
Internet to contact each other and initiate some violent
activities such as separatist movements and border
issues movements. It is reasonable to suggest that
conflict Internet censorship can prevent such activities
from happening, and perhaps it lowers crime rate in
the process.
Based on these points, it is important to rethink the
impact of Internet censorship and who are affected
by it. If most Internet users are educated individuals
who are risk averse, preventing them to access violent
and pornographic media will not significantly change
anything. In fact, censorship in general may not be
very useful for individuals who are not likely to be a
criminal in the first place, and perhaps that is just what
Internet censorship is doing.
Unless the contents are about concrete violent plans
such as separatist movements, Internet censorship may
not be a very good idea as not only it jeopardizes a
country’s freedom of speech, it can also be misused by
the political party running the government. Perhaps a
better idea is to focus on increasing a country’s educa-
tion level, as it makes individuals more “immune” to
these perceived negative contents. Instead of focusing
on filtering information, we should focus on helping
residents to be able to process information correctly.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the main results that can be obtained
from our analysis are of the following. There is no
sufficient evidence to suggest that there is a causal
relationship between political, social or tools Internet
censorship and crime rate. There is sufficient evidence
to suggest that conflict Internet censorship has a neg-
ative impact on crime rate for highly educated coun-
tries, but not for poorly educated countries. There is
sufficient evidence to suggest that Internet penetration
has negative impact on crime rate for highly edu-
cated countries, but not for poorly educated countries.
However, there are limitations to our analysis in the
following aspects. The data obtained may not be the
correct proxy for the data we wanted. For example,
the crime index calculated may not be the best overall
estimate of a country’s crime rate. Our sample size is
only 60 countries because of the unavailability of the
data. If we can get a larger sample size, we can make
the models more efficient.
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